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This paper aims to connect two strands of the venture capital literature: the inter-relationships among 
venture capitalists (VCs) on the one hand, and between VCs and their funds providers on the other hand. It 
examines the existence of a relationship between type of fund provider and skill characteristics of the VCs 
partners in a syndication deal. In other words, it examines whether captive/independent VCs privilege 
partnerships with firms with specific skills? We develop a theoretical analysis to compare the syndication 
behaviors of independent and captive VCs. Based on a game-theoretical approach, we model whether the type of 
lead VC has an influence on the optimal (related to skill levels) partnerships established with syndicate members.  
Our paper highlights that the source of finance matters for the syndication choice. Its influence takes 
two forms. The first is related to the heterogeneity between a captive and an independent VC in relation to the 
returns from the funded project: independent VCs (IVCs) tend to participate in higher profitability syndicated 
funding projects than captive VCs (CVCs). The second is related to heterogeneity among captive and 
independent VCs in the ability to syndicate. This is related strongly to the types of financial incentives funds 
providers employ to align the VC’s interests with their own goals. Our analysis suggests that these incentives 
play a decisive role in the bargaining power of the lead VC and generally make IVCs more attractive syndication 
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Much of the existing research on venture capital focuses on the interaction between 
entrepreneurial companies and venture capitalist firms (VCs). Work in this area focuses on 
investment choices (Repullo and Suarez 2004; Fairchild 2004, 2011; De Bettignies and 
Brander, 2007; Hellmann, 2006), contracting (Hellmann, 2006; Casamatta, 2003; Cornelli and 
Yosha, 2003), post-investment (Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 1995; Sorensen, 2007; Tian, 2011; 
Wang and Zhou, 2004) and exits (Puri and Zarutskie, 2012; Cumming, 2008; Hochberg, 
2012). We extend this literature by contributing to the research on the inter-relationships 
between VCs on the one hand, and between VCs and their funds providers on the other hand. 
This paper is related to a specific aspect of the literature studying the inter-
relationships among VCs. We focus on the role of partners' skills in the formation and 
efficiency of VC syndicates. Our work is in line with theoretical papers that highlight the 
importance of skills in syndication processes, and their influence on competition among VCs 
(Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007; Alvim, 2011) or the returns from funded projects 
(Brander et al., 2002). It also adds to the empirical results showing that VCs tend to choose 
their syndication partners based on their skills and knowledge, for strategic considerations 
(Hopp, 2008), agency costs (Meuleman et al. 2010), or position in a syndication network 
(Hopp, 2010; Abell and Nisar, 2007; Hochberg et al., 2007; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). 
We also contribute to the stream of research on the interactions between VCs and their 
funds providers. Several studies (Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2001; Robbie et al., 1997; 
Hellman et al., 2008; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005) show that there are differences in the 
investment strategies of an independent VCs, that is, a firm where no single investor or 
shareholder is dominant in the firm's ownership, and a captive VC, that is, a company that 
belongs to a corporation that is investing its own resources. Our paper is influenced 
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particularly by a few works that highlight that captive and independent VCs tend to adopt 
specific strategies related to syndication. Heterogeneous syndication behaviors are explained 
by the influence of the new venture on the value of the captive VC’s core assets (Hellmann, 
2002), differences between captive and independent VCs to enhance the entrepreneur’s 
incentive to exert effort (Arping and Falconieri, 2010), or by the ability of captive venture 
capitalists to attain central positions in syndication networks (Keil et al., 2010).  
This paper is the first to link these two strands of the VC literature. It investigates the 
existence of a relationship between type of funds provider and the skills characteristics of the 
VC partner in a syndication deal. In other words, it examines whether captive (independent) 
VCs privilege partnerships with VCs endowed with specific skills? 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the main results in the literature on 
the relationships between skills and syndication one the one hand, and on the interactions 
between types of funds providers and syndication on the other (Section 2). Section 3 develops 
a model to compare the syndication behaviors of independent and captive VCs. Using a game-
theoretical approach, we analyze whether the type - captive or independent - of lead VC has 
an influence on the optimal form of partnership (partners’ skills) established with other 
syndicate members. Section 4 presents our theoretical results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Syndication, skills and funds providers 
2.1. Skills and syndication 
The level and nature of the skills of the partners involved in a syndicated venture 
capital investment are crucial for its efficiency. VCs’ skills are determined mainly by two 
factors. The first is level of experience. This matters for several reasons. First, there is a 
learning effect from experience of past investments, which facilitates the VCs' interpretation 
of the information provided by portfolio companies in the form of business plans or monthly 
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reports, for example (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza, 1992; Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). Second, there is empirical evidence that venture capital firms whose associates have 
prior business experience (entrepreneurial, managerial or consulting) provide more support 
and better governance. They are more active in recruiting managers and directors and in 
fundraising, and interact more frequently with their portfolio companies (Bottazzi et al., 2004, 
2008). Also, Sorensen (2007) finds that experienced VCs add more value and result in a 
higher rate of listings of companies. 
The second skills-related factor is level of specialization. VC specialization at a 
particular stage of development and/or in a particular industry sector can reduce screening and 
monitoring costs (Manigart, 1994; De Clercq and Dimov, 2003). Moreover, according to 
Gupta and Sapienza (1992) and Wright and Robbie (1998) limited industry or development 
stage investment improves the VC firm's level of control over the financed companies; that is, 
the VC company's better understanding of the industry or development stage makes it more 
difficult for the portfolio companies to hide management incompetence or conceal 
information on company performance. Finally, Gompers et al. (2009) find that VCs that 
specialize in just a few industries perform better than generalist VCs.   
Thus, VCs are characterized by a particular skills level determined by their specific 
experience/specialization, a combination that determines their ability to screen, control and 
manage the investment projects. Whatever the skill level of the VC it is likely to benefit from 
syndicating and being able to exploit the skills of syndicate members, which, in turn, are 
likely to enhance the value of the relevant investment portfolios.  
Several studies have investigated the role of partners' skills in the formation and 
efficiency of VC syndicates. Brander et al. (2002) is an important theoretical paper in this 
area. They consider that VCs may have complementary skills, and propose a value-added 
hypothesis according to which, syndication adds value to a given project because, compared 
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to a single VC, a larger number of VCs allows improved managerial support, higher 
reputation, and a larger variety of contacts for the portfolio firms. This implies that syndicated 
projects should show higher rates of return than standalone projects. Using Canadian data for 
the 1990s, they find that syndicated deals produce higher returns, which supports their value-
added hypothesis. 
Several theoretical papers developed this theory further
4
. Casamatta and Haritchabalet 
(2007) provide a rationale for the syndication of venture capital investments based on the 
trade-off between the need to gather accurate information on the quality of an investment 
opportunity, and the need to maintain monopoly profits. Thus, forming a syndicate may be 
useful for a lone VC since a syndicate implies a coordination device that prevents the 
occurrence of profit-dissipating competition. From their model, Casamatta and Haritchabalet 
conclude that level of experience is a major determinant of the syndication decision. They 
highlight that: (1) syndication is negatively related to the VCs' level of experience; (2) 
experienced VCs syndicate with experienced VCs.  
Along similar lines, Alvim (2011) constructed a model of syndication involving two 
differently-experienced VCs, based on the idea that, participation in a project would allow a 
less experienced VC to learn from cooperation with a more experienced VC, and improve its 
screening and value-added skills. Furthermore, the less experienced VC should benefit from 
inclusion in a network of relations which might affect VC competition. A dynamic 
disincentive to syndicate might occur if potentially profitable syndications are avoided in 
order not to increase future competition. In this case, the model shows that syndications 
among VCs with similar levels of experience will be less affected by dynamic considerations. 
Hence, syndication among similarly experienced VCs will be more likely than syndication 
among VCs with heterogeneous skills. 
                                                          
4
 Among other theoretical works that highlight the importance of experience for the formation and efficiency of 
investment syndicates, see in particular Cestone et al. (2006) and Tykvova (2007). 
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Several empirical studies show that lead VCs tend to choose syndication partners 
based on the complementarity of their skills and knowledge (Lockett and Wright, 2001; 
Manigart et al., 2006). Hopp (2008) shows that very similar experience and expertise of lead 
investor and potential partner hinders collaboration. This result is explained by the significant 
role played by strategic considerations: in line with Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007), 
cooperating with a VC with similar skills could negate the competitive advantage of the 
leader. Meuleman et al. (2010) show that the higher the levels of knowledge 
complementarities, the higher are the agency costs associated with mutual monitoring among 
syndicate partners. In this case, relational embeddedness may facilitate the development of 
trust among syndicate members, thereby reducing the need for mutual monitoring, and 
promoting information sharing. The importance of skills is highlighted also by Hopp (2010), 
who shows that VCs with more industry experience tend to rely more on syndication because 
of the former’s greater number of past transactions and larger number of network partners. 
This gives them an influential position which increases the probability of their being invited 
to participate in syndicated deals. As leaders of future syndications, they will be likely to 
provide syndicate partners with access to other profitable deals. To sum up, industry 
experience implies a central network position for a VC, which in turn makes it a more 
attractive syndication partner for other VCs.  
 
2.2 Funds providers and syndication 
The typical structure and functioning of the professional private equity industry 
generally follow the pattern of the VC firms forming a limited VC partnership fund, in which 
they participate as general partners and which raises money from the limited partners, that is, 
the funds providers. The limited partners are wealthy individuals and institutions with large 
amounts of available capital, such as state and private pension funds, university financial 
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endowments, foundations, and pension and insurance companies, and pooled investment 
vehicles, such as funds of funds or mutual funds. Within this typical VC firm organization 
there are independent organizations in which no single investor or shareholder is dominant in 
the firm's ownership (Gompers and Lerner, 2004). 
There are also other VC types which vary in their governance and objectives. These 
are corporate VCs, bank-affiliated VCs, and public VCs (financed mainly with public 
money). Corporate and bank-affiliated VCs are referred to as captive VCs. A captive venture 
VC is a company that belongs to an established corporation that is investing its own 
resources. The parent organization may be a financial institution, such as a bank (bank-
affiliated VCs), but may be a larger non-financial company (corporate VCs). These VC funds 
tend to be open-ended and the amounts allocated for investment purposes reflect the overall 
strategy of the parent institution. 
Several empirical studies, providing evidence for different periods and different 
countries, show that funds providers' investment preferences influence the characteristics of 
the venture capital investment. The study by Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2001) which 
exploits information from interviews and responses to questionnaires from VCs in the UK, 
show that, compared to captive VCs, independent VC firms tend more often to adopt 
investment behaviors and preferences that signal competence to their fund providers. In 
particular, they find that independent VCs are more attracted to investments with high 
expected financial returns. These findings are supported by other studies (Robbie et al., 1997). 
Empirical work shows also that although captive VCs, like other funds providers, seek a 
reasonable rate of return on their funds, they may have other goals, different from those of 
institutional investors. For instance, Hellman, Lindsey and Puri (2008) in a study of the US 
venture capital market find that captive banking organizations invest in venture capital funds 
to build relationships that will benefit their long run lending activities (the so-called 
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“relationship hypothesis”). Likewise, corporate VCs generally expect “strategic” returns as 
well as financial returns. These strategic returns include access to new technologies and 
organizational learning (Chesbrough, 2002; Keil et al., 2008).  
Despite these differences in organizational structures and objectives, captive VCs are 
similar to other VCs in that the syndicated investments account for a large fraction of their 
overall investments (Dushnitsky, 2006). However, a few theoretical and empirical works 
highlight that captive VCs also tend to adopt specific syndication strategies. In particular, 
Hellmann (2002) proposes a model in which the entrepreneur can choose among independent 
VCs (pursuing financial objectives only) and a strategic captive corporate VC (ownership of 
some asset whose value will be affected by the new venture). Both compete on valuation and 
on the value-adding support provided to the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur’s choice depends 
on the underlying characteristics of the new venture. In particular, if the new venture 
cannibalizes the captive core asset, the model predicts syndicated finance where the 
independent VC is the lead investor, providing active support to the venture and typically 
having board membership. In the case of the captive VC, it remains a passive investor, does 
not become involved in support and does not participate as a board member. The role of the 
captive VC is to hold equity in order to reduce the independent VC’s stake in the new venture 
and prevent excessive cannibalization of the captive VC’s core assets. 
Arping and Falconieri (2010) recently developed a theory of financing choice between 
strategic and financial investors. Their approach is founded on the idea that strategic 
investors, such as corporate VCs, face a trade-off when financing start-up firms to 
complement their core businesses and to facilitate the internalization of externalities. 
Although strategic objectives may make it more worthwhile for the investor to elicit high 
entrepreneurial effort, they may simultaneously undermine commitment to penalizing 
managerial slack by terminating the entrepreneur’s project. Arping and Falconieri study the 
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case of a syndication deal between a strategic investor and an independent investor. The 
model shows that syndication makes the strategic investor less reluctant to terminate the 
project in the event of poor performance because its stake in the project is reduced relative to 
the standalone case, which in turn, restores the credibility of the termination threat. Thus, 
syndicating the deal and bringing in an independent investor restores financial discipline and 
enhances the entrepreneur’s incentive to exert effort. 
In section 3, we develop a model that is underpinned by the two strands of the 
literature discussed above and tries to link them. It compares the syndication behaviors of 
independent and captive VCs. 
 
 
3 The model 
The model analyzes the optimal partnerships of two different types of VCs potentially 
responsible for a risky project. An independent VC (IVC) raises money from limited partners 
supposed to be institutional investors; a captive VC (CVC) is affiliated to a parent company 
which is its permanent financial partner. The model considers situations where the projects 
funded by different types of VCs have the same initial characteristics. The VC can then 
manage the project on its own or choose to associate a syndicate. The VC that we describe as 
the leader or lead VC can manage the project in two stages. In the initial period (“project-
seeking stage”), the leader and the syndicate, if any, conduct screening to distinguish - more 
or less efficiently - good from bad projects. If a project is deemed bad, it is liquidated at the 
end of the  initial stage. If not, it progresses to the development stage. During the development 
phase, the leader and the syndicate, if any, manage the project.  
Syndicates have different skills and qualities which enhance the gain that the VCs can 
expect from management of a given project. Since syndicates are heterogeneous, they 
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generate different costs for lead VCs which must share a part of their profits. Thus, each VC 
will try to set up a partnership with an appropriate type of syndicate, given the costs and the 
benefits associated with each kind of partnership. Each syndicate receives one or more 
propositions to partner, from different types of leaders, and chooses the best proposition. We 
develop the model as a matching game between leaders and syndicates, in a setting where the 
leaders are IVCs or CVCs and the syndicates are endowed with different skills. The model 
analyzes the way a project is developed (including the form of syndication it chooses, if any) 
according to the nature of the leader and the initial returns from the projects.  
 
3.1 Projects, leaders, syndicates and sequences of the deal 
 
The success or the failure of a deal depends on the nature of the project, the financial 




Projects correspond to different sectors of activity. Whatever the sector of activity, 
there are different classes of projects characterized by respective levels of risk and return. A 
project of class       has the probability   to provide a gross return  , and a probability   to 
fail for managerial reasons, and a probability         to fail for technological reasons. 
When a project fails, it provides no returns. The class of the project and the return   are 
observable by VCs. 
 
3.1.2 Leaders  
Leaders are defined according to the nature of their funds providers and their level of 
expertise. When a given leader applies a costly effort  ,            o disclose a bad project 
at the initial stage, the probability of disclosing a project that is likely to fail for managerial 
reasons is also  , independent of the level of risk of the project. The leader’s level of expertise 
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is inversely related with the unitary cost c of its screening effort during the early stage. The 
cost of   is given by the quadratic function         . If at the end of the initial period the 
project is not liquidated, the leader monitors the development of the project at a fixed cost  ̅. 
During each stage of the process, the leader may or not require the aid and advice of a 
syndicate.  
The payment (or profit) of leaders is the difference between two terms: the 
undiscounted expected gross return from the project and the undiscounted costs associated 
with each stage of its development. The expected (net) return is determined by the class of the 
project, the expertise of the leader, the net contribution of the syndicate, if any, and by the 
type of the leader’s funds providers.  
In line with the literature, we suppose that institutional investors encourage high return 
projects and then pay to IVCs a bonus which we assume will be proportional to the expected 
gross return from the project
5
.  
CVCs are linked to a parent company which is the permanent partner. In line with the 
literature, we suppose that the parent company “strategically” engages in VC financing in 
order to select firms whose skills will complement its core activities. Because maximizing 
returns is not the sole objective of the lead VC, we suppose that the compensation scheme is 
dependent on non-returns variables, such as the proportion of investment projects brought to 
successful completion. In our setting, we suppose that if the leader is captive, the parent 
company uses the redistribution to the leader of a fixed bonus, as an incentive device for the 
project reaching its term. The last component of the payment received by the leaders is 
provided by the effort of syndicates if leaders choose to associate them with the development 
of the project.  
                                                          
5
 IVCs' funds providers are mainly interested in the return on their own investment in the deal. This return 
depends on the amount of their financial investment, on the nature of the project, on the actions of the leader and 
syndicate (if any) but the costs supported by the leader and the syndicate are not supported nor shared by the 
funds provider. The funds provider uses incentives to drive the actions of the leader and syndicates in its 
preferred direction but does not co-manage the deal. 
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The leaders’ costs are, first, the costs associated with their efforts during the two 
stages of development. Second, the share of the payment they are obliged to renounce if they 
integrate syndicates as partners in the development of the projects. There is also another kind 
of cost that can be compared to the models proposed by Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007) 
and Alvim (2011), and which is associated with information transmitted by the leader to the 
syndicates. This cost is related to the leaders’ providing the syndicates - which are also their 
competitors - with access to private information through participation in the management of 
the project. We express this fixed cost as  .  
 
3.1.3. Syndicates 
Syndicates are partners which the leader may or not associate with the project’s initial 
and development phases. Syndicates have two characteristics: level of specialization and level 
of experience.  
During the initial stage, the screening period, for the sake of simplicity we suppose 
that the efficiency of the syndicate depends only of its level of sectorial specialization which 
enables more in-depth understanding of the technology specific to the project and reduces 
screening costs (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; De Clercq and Dimov, 2003). Thus, we suppose 
that specialized syndicates apply an effort  ,           to disclose bad projects that may fail 
for technological reasons. Their probability of success then is also g independent of the risk of 
the project. 
During the development stage, syndicating a deal with partners specialized in a 
particular industry is likely to enhance the profitability of the funded project by improving the 
VCs’ level of control over the financed companies and reducing monitoring costs (Gompers et 
al., 2009; De Clerq and Dimov, 2003; Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; Wright and Robbie, 1998). 
For this reason we suppose that during the development stage, specialized syndicates can 
13 
 
apply an effort           to boost the returns from a good project by         where   is 
a positive parameter.  
On the other hand, syndicating during the development stage with experienced 
partners implies improved managerial support and a larger variety of contacts for the portfolio 
firms (Brander et al., 2002; Alvim, 2011; Hopp, 2010). Therefore, setting up partnerships 
with experienced VCs may be an efficient method to reduce the probability of the investment 
projects failing. Therefore, in our model we assume that during the development stage, 
experienced syndicates apply an effort           to procure a floor-return   from an 
expected proportion   of projects, initially bad for managerial reasons, but which have not 
been eliminated during the initial stage as a result of the leader’s screening efforts. 
Syndicates are heterogeneous in their levels of experience and specialization. For 
simplicity, we assume there are three types of syndicates
6
.The first two forms are active in the 
two periods and provide different forms of aid in each stage of the development of a given 
project; the third form is active only during the second period. 
 Experienced and specialized syndicates: in the initial period provide the level 
of effort   to disclose the quality of the projects at a cost    
    where   , is a 
positive constant. In the development stage, they are able to apply the levels 
of effort   and   at the respective costs    
  and    
 , to procure a return   
from a proportion   of the projects initially considered bad projects, and to 
boost the returns from the good projects by        , where   ,   ,   and   
are positive constants.  
 Specialized and non-experienced syndicates: in the initial period they provide 
the level of effort   at a cost    
   and in the development stage the level of 
effort   at a cost    
 . 
                                                          
6
 For obvious reasons, syndicates that are neither experienced nor specialized will never be chosen by the leader. 
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 Experienced and non-specialized syndicates: during the development stage 
only, they procure a floor-return   from a proportion   of the projects initially 
considered bad projects, at a cost    
 . 
 
For leaders, syndicates are partners not employees. In other words, leaders do not provide to 
syndicates payments proportional to their level of effort or the time they devote to the 
partnership. They must share with them a part of their own gain, or at least a part of the gain 
to which they contribute, but not all of the costs they face. We suppose that the nature/quality 
of syndicates is observable by leaders. Leaders share with syndicates a proportion
7
 of the 
expected development costs that are saved if the syndicates participate in the project selection 
at the initial stage. They also share with the syndicates the profit that the latter contributes to 
generating through their value-adding activity, during the second stage. This form of payment 
incentive means that the syndicates’ rewards are dependent on both their own quality and 
level of effort, and also the quality of the leader, the incentives provided to the leader by its 
funds providers, and the quality of the project.  
 
3.1.4 Form of the game and sequence of actions 
 
The model takes the form of a game with two types of players, leaders and syndicates. 
Since our objective is to study the style of syndication concluded by each type of leader, in a 
world where they compete to obtain more efficient partnerships, we suppose a single IVC and 
a single CVC endowed with the same skills as leaders. These two leaders differ only in the 
type of incentives chosen by their funds provider (a premium paid on the profits to the IVC 
and a bonus based on the number of developed projects for the CVC). Each of them observes 
a single project. The two projects are identical: they have the same returns in the case of 
                                                          
7
That we supposed given by convention. 
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success R, the same risks components (i.e., p and q). The two leaders have the possibility to 
match with three available syndicates, one of each style. They can also, if they prefer, develop 
the project without a syndicate. In each case, we assume the projects are viable. The game has 
two phases: the matching process phase and the development process phase.  
 
The matching/bargaining process takes the following form: 
(i) Each leader chooses the type of solution (partnership with one type of syndicate or 
stand-alone option) to maximize its net expected return. If this solution includes partnership 
with a syndicate, the leader proposes partnership with the relevant syndicate, in a take-it or 
leave-it offer, according to the rules presented in section 3.1.3. If the best solution is the 
stand-alone one, the leader does not make an offer. 
(ii) Syndicates collect the offers, if any. If a given syndicate has two offers, it chooses 
the better one. When a given syndicate receives only one offer, it accepts it8. 
(iii) When the offer of one of the leaders has been refused at step (ii), this leader either 
makes a new offer to another syndicate or chooses the stand-alone solution if this is now the 
better remaining solution. 
(iv) If relevant, the syndicate receiving the new offer responds. 
 
The development process then begins. Each leader develops its project in a two stage 
development setting, with the following sequences. 
(i) The first stage (the “project-seeking stage”) is a selection stage: during this stage, 
the leader applies its screening efforts to determining the nature of the project. It is assisted or 
not by a specialized syndicate, according its previous choices. Leaders and syndicates 
mutually observe one another’s efforts and cannot cheat. When a given project is revealed as 
                                                          
8
 We suppose, without any consequence other than simplifying technical treatment of the model, that the nature 
of the offers always excludes that reservation is the best solution for syndicates that receive offers. We then 
exclude the cases of leaders and syndicates that do not find partners. 
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a bad project during the initial stage, it is liquidated and the process ends. The leader incurs a 
loss in the form of the costs that supported the project selection stage. When a given project is 
not revealed as a bad project the project progresses to the development stage. 
(ii) During the second stage (“development stage”), the leader devotes its efforts to the 
managerial development. If the leader has chosen to associate a syndicate, a specialized 
syndicate will improve project profitability in the case of a good project, and an experienced 
syndicate will improve the management of a fraction of the projects not revealed as bad 
projects during the first stage. If the syndicate is both experienced and specialized, it will 
devote effort to the first or second objective, depending on the nature of the project. Leaders 
and syndicates observe their respective efforts and cannot cheat. At the end of the second 
stage, the remaining bad projects are liquidated; the other projects are introduced to the 
market or are taken over.  
The game is played according to backward induction. The leader rationally anticipates 
the consequences of its own choices on the choice of effort of each category of syndicate 
during each stage of the process. It also anticipates the consequences of each possible choice 
of partnership on its expected payment. The leader’s propositions to the syndicates are 
designed to maximize the leader’s gains. It indicates its own level of effort to the syndicates. 
Each syndicate responds to each proposition by selecting a level of effort that maximizes the 
syndicate’s total net payment. If a syndicate receives two propositions simultaneously, it will 
choose the proposition that maximizes its payment. The equilibrium solutions to the game are 
(i) matching pairs between leaders and syndicates, (ii) the level of effort of each of leader and 
partner in the development process. 
In each of four possibilities of association/non-association with a syndicate, leaders 
have different payoffs functions. Also, each syndicate has two possible payoffs according to 




3.2 Leaders’ and syndicates’ payoffs: 
 
The leader’s payoffs depend on whether it is an IVC or a CVC, and on the type of 
their partner in the two stages of development of the project.    
 
3.2.1 Independent VC's profits 
The specificity of an IVC is that it is funded by an institutional investor that is 
interested mainly in a financial return. The incentive device used by the fund provider consists 
of providing to the leader a bonus in the proportion         of the gross return from the 
project. We begin by formulating the stand-alone payoff, then the profit corresponding to each 
kind of partnership. 
 
The stand-alone IVC payoff: 
This is expressed as (1) 
 
       
       
       
             ̅       (1) 
 
The first term in (1) represents the expected gross return from the project. The second 
term corresponds to the cost of the screening effort during the initial stage. The third term is 
the development cost during the second stage. This cost decreases with the amount of effort in 
the previous stage: the greater is e, the smaller the proportion of bad projects developed 
during the second period.  
 




This payoff is expressed as (2) 
 
     
       
       
     [                ]       ̅         (2) 
 
where the term          corresponds to the profit generated by the rehabilitated projects,   
is the proportion of this profit payed to the syndicate and   is the cost of diffusion of 
information supported by the leader when it decides to associate partners who are also 
competitors in other deals. 
 
The payoff of an IVC matched with a specialized (non-experienced) syndicate during the 
whole development process: 
This payoff is expressed as (3) 
 
 
     
       
       
                  
      ̅                      
 (3) 
where the term  ̅         represents the expected reduction in costs during the 
development stage,           is the share of this reduction paid by the leader to the 
syndicate,           is the additional expected profit generated by the effort h of the 
syndicate during the development period and            is the part of this profit paid to 
the syndicates.   
 
The payoff of an IVC matched with a specialized and experienced syndicate during the whole 
development process: 




         
       
       
          [                 ]
      ̅                       
 (4) 
where the information cost    is such that     .  
3.2.2  Captive VCs' profits 
As explained above, we suppose that the VC’s parent company uses the redistribution 
to the leader of a fixed bonus   as an incentive device, when a project is developed to its full 
term. 
 
The stand-alone CVC payoff: 
This payoff is expressed as (5) 
       
       
       
            ̅       (5) 
where B is the amount of the bonus paid by the financial partner when a project is introduced 
to the market or is taken-over.  
 
The payoff of a CVC matched with an experienced (non-specialized) syndicate during the 
development period: 
This payoff is expressed as (6) 
 
    
       
       
                        
      ̅        
 (6) 
where the term             is the gross return from a bad project given the bonus 
distributed by the financial partner, and the efforts of the leader in the initial stage and of the 





The payoff of a CVC matched with a specialized (non-experienced) syndicate during the 
whole development process: 
This payoff is expressed as (7)  
 
    
       
       
                
       ̅                      
 (7) 
 
where all the terms have already been defined. 
 
The payoff of a CVC matched with a specialized and experienced syndicate during the whole 
development process: 
This payoff is expressed as (8)  
 
         
       
       
            [                 ]
       ̅                       
 (8) 
 
3.2.3 Experienced (non-specialized) syndicates’ profits 
The two possible partnerships give the following payments: 
 
The payoff of an experienced syndicate matched with an IVC leader: 
This payoff is expressed as (9)  
     
       
       
                       (9) 
where    is the level of effort maximizing the payment of the IVC in such a partnership and 
    
 .  
 
The payoff of an experienced syndicate matched with a CVC leader: 
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This payoff is expressed as (10)  
     
       
       
                      (10) 
where    is the level of effort maximizing the payment of the CVC in such a partnership.  
 
3.2.4 Specialized (non-experienced) syndicates profits 
The two possible partnerships provide the following payments: 
 
The payoff of a specialized syndicate matched with an IVC leader: 
This payoff is expressed as (11) 
 
    
       
              
    ̅                    
          
 (11) 





The payoff of a specialized syndicate matched with a CVC leader: 
This payoff is expressed as (12) 
 
    
       
               
    ̅               
          
 (12) 
 
3.2.5 Specialized and experienced syndicates’ profits 
The two possible partnerships of this last form of syndicate give the following 
payments: 
 
                                                          
9
We introduce this assumption to avoid sensitivity of our results to difference in syndicates’ skills and thus their 




The payoff of an experienced and specialized syndicate matched with an IVC leader: 
This payoff is expressed as (13) 
 
    
        
    
                      
         [              ]
   ̅                        
 (13) 
where    is the level of effort maximizing the payment of the CVC in such a partnership.  
 
The payoff of an experienced and specialized syndicate matched with a CVC leader: 
This payoff is expressed as (14) 
    
        
    
                      
    [                  ]
   ̅                        
 (14) 
 
4  Optimal syndication choices: results and comments 
The game presented in section 3 has many possible outcomes. Our assumptions, 
especially absence of fixed costs for leaders in the stand-alone case and for syndicates in all 
cases, preclude any relevance to the reservation solution where leaders would reject the 
project for development. Whatever the values of the parameters, all profits functions are 
continuously derivable from the arguments. This property is maintained if the optimal values 
          and    are derived by solving the game through backward induction. Each pair 
{leader, syndicate} or {leader, stand-alone} then provides an optimal solution {           } 
and a profit for each partner associated to this solution. Comparison of the profits associated 
with the different partnerships is then always possible for leaders and for syndicates. If two 
leaders choose initially different forms of assistance (including the stand-alone option), their 
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first proposition is automatically accepted and the game is at equilibrium. If the two leaders 
propose to associate the same syndicate, the latter compares the profit expected from each 
partnership and chooses the better offer. If the proposition of a given leader is refused at the 
first step in the matching game, this leader makes a second offer (including the stand-alone 
option) which automatically is satisfied. The game then ends at this moment. Although a 
Stackelberg equilibrium always exists, it can take different forms. Formally, if the 
experienced syndicates (specialized or not) are activated, their level of effort    is always 
positive
10
. Similarly, if specialized syndicates (experienced or not) are activated, their 
equilibrium levels of efforts          are always positive at equilibrium11. However, this 
does not mean that the equilibrium level of effort    would vanish if the optimal solution 
integrates an experienced syndicate although this would apply when the better solution is to 
allow a minimal return from a bad project rather than eliminating it at the initial stage of 
development. This case corresponds to large values of  , and c and a low value for c’12. This 
is a “technical consequence” of the quadratic form of the cost c. We do not consider this case. 
Similarly, we also do not consider cases where the values of c and c’ are so low that one or 
more efforts is at its maximal bound              or     for one of the pairs 
{leader, syndicate} at equilibrium. We focus on cases with interior solutions in efforts 
{           }. Given the simple form of the model, the equilibrium solutions can then be 
analyzed according to the relevant parameters of the model. The following propositions can 
then be derived. 
 
                                                          
10
Suppose they are not; in this case the leader's payments given by (2), (4), (6) or (8) are always dominated by 
(1), (3), (5) or (7). Rationally, then, the leader would never propose such an association. 
11
This property is associated with the form of the cost functions    
 
and     .  
12
 This case would correspond to leaders with low level expertise (very large value of c) able to find high-skilled 
partners (very low values of c’). 
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Proposition 1: Whatever the values of the parameters                          , all 
increases in the efficiency of the leaders (i.e. decreases in  ) will decrease the willingness to 
syndicate with an experienced leader (specialized or not). They have no influence on the 
willingness of leaders to syndicate with a specialized (not experienced) syndicate. 
Proof: see Appendix 1.  
This result is a consequence of the experienced syndicates’ contribution. Due to their 
capacity to compensate for a rather inefficient leader and poor quality screening activity, 
experienced syndicates allow the non-expert leader efficiently to reject few bad projects 
during the initial stage without bad consequences on their payoff. Conversely, since the 
specialization of syndicates tends to complement rather than substitute for the qualities of the 
leader, the propensity to associate with a specialized syndicate does not depend on the 
characteristics of the leader.  
 
Proposition 2: Whatever the values of the parameters                          , all 
increases in the ex-ante returns   from good projects will increase leaders’ willingness to 
syndicate with specialized syndicates (experienced or not). These increases have no influence 
on their willingness to syndicate with an experienced (not specialized) syndicate. 
The return from projects has no influence on the efficiency of the experienced 
syndicates’ effort. Thus, the propensity to syndicate with experienced partners is not 
influenced by the returns expected from the projects. Conversely, since the efficiency of the 
effort of specialized syndicates in the development stage is governed by the initial “quality” 
of the good projects, specialization is appreciated more and seen as more valuable if the good 
projects have high returns. The screening effort in the initial stage contributes also to 
25 
 
minimizing the expected number of bad projects at the beginning of the development stage. 
After that stage, it is easier to devote all efforts to enhancing the returns from the remaining 
good projects. Note then that the preference for a syndicate that is both experienced and 
specialized is limited to cases where the difference in the cost to the leader        is 
reasonable.  
Proposition 3: Whatever the values of the parameters                            , and 
the first choice of the CVC, the IVC can always syndicate with a specialized syndicate when 
this choice is its first choice. 
Proof: see Appendix 3. 
 
Proposition 4: Whatever values of the parameters                 , there is a range of 
values of the parameters                such that the IVC syndicates with an experienced 
syndicate, even if this style of syndication is also preferred by the CVC. 
Proof: see Appendix 4 
 
Corollary: IVCs have preferential access to specialized syndicates and the capacity to dispute 
preferential access of CVCs to experienced syndicates.  
Propositions 3 and 4 reveal that IVCs have an advantage on CVCs in the syndication 
process. While IVCs have preferential access to specialized syndicates, the symmetric result 
does not hold. IVCs can dispute the preferential access of CVCs to experienced syndicates, 
while this type of syndication obviously is more adapted to the nature of their bonus and to 
the interests of their financial partners. Since they are more motivated than CVCs by the 
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returns from projects, IVCs have a higher propensity to choose the style of syndicate that 
increases the returns from the project. CVCs are encouraged by their funds providers to 
develop as many projects as possible. This generates a tendency to syndicate with experienced 
(not necessarily specialized) partners. However imagine that the performance of specialized 
syndicates is very weak, and the probability of project success and the quality of the leaders  
insufficient to motivate IVCs to concentrate on the best projects. In this case, a generous 
premium paid by the IVC fund-providers on the returns from the projects may motivate the 
IVCs to choose a syndicate that will rehabilitate the quality of the bad projects during the 
development stage, and to syndicate with experienced syndicates. In this case, the level of 
incentive provided by the different funds providers will determine the bargaining powers of 
the two leaders: if the incentive provided by the IVC fund providers is greater than the bonus 
paid by the financial partner to the captive VC, the IVC will crowd out the CVC from its 
“natural” partnership.  
 
Proposition 5: Whatever the values of the parameters                            , as 
soon as the IVC chooses to syndicate, the level of selectivity and/or the profit of the IVC will 
be higher than the level of selectivity and/or the profit of the CVC, except if the IVC tries to 
syndicate with experienced (not specialized) partners and finally fails in this syndication 
attempt.  
Proof: see Appendix 3 
This proposition still exhibits the efficiency advantages of IVCs over CVCs. The incentive 
provided by the financial partners of IVCs orientates their choice of a form of syndication that 
will improve the selectivity and the profitability of the projects. Only in extreme cases, that is, 
if the ex-ante probability of the deal’s success, its expected return and the level of the 
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financial incentives provided by the IVCs financial partners are all low, might they have less 
success in their attempts to syndicate (in this case with experienced partners) and might fail to 




This paper provides a number of interesting results related to syndication in the 
venture capital industry. First, the model suggests a negative relationship between the level of 
expertise of the lead VCs and their willingness to syndicate. It supports recent empirical 
studies (Verwaal et al., 2010) and theoretical models (Casamatta and Haritchbalet, 2007) 
which point to a similar relationship. More generally, our work supports the findings from 
studies in the tradition of Brander et al. (2002) that propose the notion that syndication 
permits VCs to combine complementary pieces of knowledge. This allows VCs to access their 
partners’ valuable resources via contributions to the screening of deals during the early stages, 
and to management during the development stage. Thus highly skilled lead VCs are less 
reliant on partners to improve deal selection and to offer good quality managerial advice.  
 
Two other results are related more specifically to the main goal of this paper which 
was to analyze whether type of funds providers influenced the skills characteristics of VC 
partners in syndication deals. Our paper highlights that the source of finance matters for 
syndication choices. This influence emerges in two forms. 
The first is the heterogeneity between captive and independent VCs in terms of returns 
from the funded projects: IVCs tend to participate in syndicates funding projects with higher 
levels of profitability than those involving CVCs. This result is not surprising; several studies 
have reached similar conclusions. The literature suggests that, as a result of their strategic 
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objectives, CVCs have less incentive than IVCs to invest in acquiring expertise and 
technology, to take overall control of entrepreneurs (De Bettignies and Chemla, 2008) or to 
liquidate their portfolio firms (Arping and Falconieri, 2010). These features would make them 
less active and efficient investors for their portfolio firms. 
Our paper relies on a different interpretation of the relationship between strategic 
objectives and investment behaviors. The originality of our analysis is that it makes an 
explicit link between the financial incentives of funds providers and the investment strategies 
of VCs and especially the types of syndication they privilege. In our interpretation, CVCs are 
not less active investors but rationally choose to set up partnerships with experienced VCs 
with lower ability to increase the short term financial profitability of projects than specialized 
VCs, but which are more efficient at improving the “strategic” returns, such as access to the 
professional network of portfolio companies, which tends to reduce the probability of projects 
failing and may be beneficial for their long-run activities.     
 
The model also points to another way that the source of finance can influence the 
syndication process. This is heterogeneity in the ability to syndicate between captive and 
independent VCs, which is strongly related to the kind of financial incentives used by funds 
providers to align VCs' interests with their own goals. Our analysis suggests that these 
incentives play a decisive role in the bargaining powers of lead VCs and generally make IVCs 
more attractive syndication partners for other VCs.  
 
However, it should be underlined that the relative lack of attractiveness of CVCs in 
syndication deals undoubtedly would be mitigated were the model to account for a number of 
elements that in the interests of simplicity we did not include. For instance, we did not take 
account of a CVC’s unique resources that might make it more attractive as a syndication 
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partner. Yet, syndicating with a CVC may give access to otherwise inaccessible resources. 
For instance, corporate VCs provide access to technical resources thanks to the parent 
company’s R&D staff which ameliorate the ability to understand the project’s underlying 
technologies and which provide assistance in the development of the technology (Maula et al., 
2005; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). They may also provide access to important market-
related resources (Katila et al., 2008), such as a developed distribution system and sales force 
which might allow the portfolio company more rapid access to global markets
13
. Another 
avenue for future research would be to discuss the impact of behavioral factors, such as trust 
or empathy, on the leader’s choice of partner and on performance (Fairchild, 2011). In 
particular, it would be interesting to analyze how the syndication choice of the leader would 
be modified if the relationships between leaders and types of syndicates were founded on 
different levels of empathy. 
Similarly, the results might differ if the model included intuitions from the emerging 
research on entrepreneurs’ financing choices (Repullo and Suarez, 2004; De Bettignies and 
Brander, 2007) and took account of the role of the entrepreneur in forming the investment 
syndicate. This role may partly explain the choice between independent and captive VCs. In 
particular, if the entrepreneur developed a venture that was complementary to the captive 
VC’s core assets, then the captive would likely be chosen because of the captive’s stronger 
incentives compared to an independent VC to provide supportive effort (Hellmann, 2002). 
Wang and Wang (2012) explore this further. Their syndication model highlights that when 
choosing a suitable lead investor, the entrepreneur needs to strike a balance between the 
syndicate’s ability to provide funding to satisfy the company’s needs and its potential to 
                                                          
13
 In the same vein, Keil et al. (2010) underline the specificity of CVCs in terms of syndication 
networks. Using data for the US market, they show that the unique resources held by corporate parents can 
substitute for lack of a prior central position in syndication networks. These resources make captive investors 
highly attractive syndication partners and help them to overcome entry barriers and to quickly attain central 




bargain over the company’s profits. In other words, their analysis underlines that the better 
organized and more value-adding “leaders-syndicate” dyads are not necessarily chosen by the 
entrepreneur because they are also well placed to bargain for a large share of the company’s 
profits. Including these elements in our theoretical framework would be interesting for future 
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1 
Consider the stand-alone solution for the IVC given by (1). Determination of the optimal level of 
effort    provides the profit       
              ̅     ⁄    ̅. This profit decreases as 
  increases. Consider now for the same IVC, the possibility to syndicate with specialized (not 
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experienced) partners. The profits (3) and (11) provide the following value for the leader profit: 
     
          
               ̅                    ⁄ . The spread between these two 
profits then is independent of c, i.e. independent of the leader’s expertise. Leader and specialized 
syndicate are interested in different parts of the project. However there is neither complementarity nor 
substitution between the leader’s effort in the initial stage and the syndicate’s efforts: these efforts are 
simply additive. Thus, the choice between the stand alone option and the possibility to syndicate with 
a specialized syndicate does not depend on c. The same conclusions can be derived from comparison 
of (5) and (6). Consider now expressions (2) and (9) determining the profit of the IVC associated with 
an experienced syndicate. From (9), the optimal effort of the syndicate    depends negatively on the 
effort of the leader   by the first order relation                     ⁄  (valid even if     . 
From this point of view, increasing   decreases the effort of the syndicate for given values of 
parameters. From (2), it also appears that   now has two effects: all increases in   directly decrease the 
expected costs at the  development stage. But the term      [                ] reveals that 
all increases in   also decrease the effect of a given effort of the syndicate. Definitively, the usual 
positive effect of   is dampened by its negative effect on the effort of the syndicate. For a given value 
of  , the optimal level of effort of the leader 
   [  ̅                   ] [                     ]⁄  when it chooses as its partner 
an experienced syndicate is then smaller than its level  ̅   ⁄   in the stand-alone case. An increase of   
then has less effect on (2) than on (1). The difference between the optimal values of (3) and (1) 
expressed as 
    ̅      
 [                     ]
      ̅  
 ̅   
  
 . One can verify that the derivative in   of 
this expression is still positive when    and    are between 0 and 1 [the details of the calculus are 
available on request]. The same proof can be replicated by comparing (5) and (6), (1) and (4), and (5) 
and (8) and determine that, as soon as the partnership includes an experienced syndicate, this 
partnership tends to be increasingly less attractive as the expertise of the leader increases, whatever the 




Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2 
Consider the stand-alone solution for the IVC given by (1). Determination of the optimal level of 
effort    provides the profit       
              ̅     ⁄    ̅. This profit increases with  . 
Consider now the profit (2) of the IVC associated with an experienced syndicate. Given that the 
effort/costs of the experienced syndicate have no effect on the return of the good project  , this new 
profit expresses as     
              where   is a function on parameters independent on  . 
Comparison between the optimal values of (1) and (2) shows that any increases/decreases in   do not 
change the choice between the stand-alone solution and partnership with an experienced syndicate. 
The spread between the profit (3) expresses optimally as 
     
          
               ̅                    ⁄  . Then all increases in   also 
increase the (positive or negative) difference between      
    and       
   . The same conclusions derive 
from comparison between (1) and (4). The same kind of proof provides the same result when one 
analyses the influence of   on the choices of the CVC.■ 
 
 
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 3 
Whatever the values of the parameters                            , if the IVC proposes association 
with a specialized (not experienced) leader, given expression (11), the efforts of the latter are 
respectively     
     ̅           ⁄  and     
               ⁄ . If the CVC proposes association 
with the same specialized (not experienced) syndicate, given expression (12), the levels of effort of the 
latter are respectively     
     ̅           ⁄  and     
          ⁄ . The resulting comparison 
between (11) and (12) proves that, whatever                           ,     
        
   
. The 




Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 4 
Whatever the values of the other parameters, if    is bigger than some ceiling value   ̅, (4) is still 
smaller than (1), (2) and (3), while (8) is still smaller than (5), (6) and (7). Both VCs then renounce 
association with an experienced and specialized syndicate. Similarly, if  , i.e., the advantage provided 
by the specialized syndicate during the development stage, in relation to improvement to the quality of 
a good project, is too small, the advantage of the specialized syndicate progressively reduces in (3) and 
(7) to its assistance in the screening tasks during the initial stage (it is only this assistance that can 
justify the information cost   supported by the leader). Similarly, the advantage of the specialized 
syndicate as assistance provider during the initial period does not compensate for the cost   when q 
tends towards       . Thus, for any positive value of  , when   and         are small, there is 
no advantage for any leader to associate with a specialized syndicate. Conversely, for any triplet 
       , there is a threshold maximal value of  , such that above this value it is still more 
advantageous for the IVC to choose the stand-alone solution than to associate with a specialized 
syndicate. Given that   is positive, in this case the CVC also prefers the stand-alone option to 
association with a specialized syndicate. By comparing (1) and (2), we see that for given values of the 
other parameters, the higher is   or  , the greater is the propensity for (2) to be greater than (1). 
Comparing (5) and (6), we observe similarly that the higher is   or  , the greater is the propensity for 
(6) to be larger than (5). When a high value of    discourages the leaders from associating with 
experienced and specialized  syndicates, the CVC then chooses to associate with experienced 
syndicates at the first step in the matching/bargaining process. At the second step of the bargaining 
process, the experienced syndicate must then compare the two propositions, i.e. the profits given 
respectively by (9) and (10) where the optimal level of effort    is different and given in each 
expression by the optimization of each leader associated to (2) and (6). In order to explore the outcome 
of this comparison, we can express first the optimal effort    associated with each situation from (9) 
and (10), then express as a function of parameters the optimal values of    in (2) and (6), and finally 
compare the payments (9) and (10). Consider first the choices resulting from the IVC offer. By 
backward induction, we obtain from (9)                     ⁄  where    is the optimal level 
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of effort if the leader and    the optimal level of effort of the syndicate. From (2), we then 
get    [  ̅                   ] [                     ]⁄ . If these two expressions 
are substituted in (9), the expected profit of the experienced (not specialized) syndicate is   
       ̅               
 [                      ]
 . The same methodology provides the value  
                  ⁄  
for the level of effort given by (10) of an experienced (not specialized) syndicate matched with a CVC. 
Similarly, by backward induction, the effort of the CVC leader given by (6) is 
   [  ̅                 ] [                   ]⁄ . If we substitute these values in 
(10), we obtain the expected profit of the experienced (not specialized) syndicate, when it is matched 
with the CVC. This profit expresses as   
       ̅             
 [                   ]
 . Comparison between the two 
profits that the syndicate can expect from association with the two leaders provides contrasting results, 
depending on several parameters, and particularly on         . For instance, for the following values 
of parameters, {         ̅                                             
      } and a value of    sufficiently high to dissuade leaders from associating with specialized 
and experienced syndicates,     
   
         while     
   
        .  In this case, given the values 
of          , the best association for both leaders is with experienced syndicates: for the same 
bargaining power   of the two leaders, the syndicate’s gain is larger with the IVC than with the CVC 
■ 
 
Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 5 
Consider the different choices of syndication of the IVC during the matching/bargaining stage of the 
game:  
- if the IVC chooses initially to syndicate with a specialized (not experienced) syndicate, given 
proposition 1, this choice is always validated by the syndicate. The efforts of leader and syndicate 
during the initial stage are given by     
     ̅   ⁄  and     
     ̅           ⁄ . The expected 
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number of bad projects developed in the development stage is then (      
   )         
       
    . The CVC then ultimately chooses one of the remaining three options, whatever the value of 
parameters. In all cases,          
   , while the level of effort  of the syndicate during the initial stage 
is at most     
     ̅           ⁄ . Given that the number of bad projects eliminated in the initial 
stage is proportional to the effort of the leader and the syndicate, it is then always smaller for the 
CVCs. 
- if the IVC initially chooses to syndicate with specialized and experienced partners,  
        
    [  ̅                   ] [                     ]⁄  and     
       
 
 ̅           ⁄   If this choice is confirmed, the CVC finally chooses one of the remaining options. 
Given that the CVC could choose to syndicate with a specialized partner or to stand alone, in some of 
these cases, the level of selection of the CVC can be higher than for the IVC. If the level of selection 
of the CVC is greater, it is excluded that     
            
        
   . From this inequality, we can deduce 
that, if the level of selection is greater for the CVC, then(   )
 
         or     . 
Comparing (3) and (7), we can deduce that the profit (3) of the IVC is bigger than the profit (7) of the 
CVC, that the profit (4) of the IVC is bigger than the profit (8) of the CVC, and that the profit (1) of 
the IVC is bigger than the profit (5) of the CVC. Since in this case, the profit (6) is bigger than (5), (7) 
and (8), we conclude that the profit (6) is bigger than the biggest among (1), (3) and (4). If the offer of 
the IVC is not accepted by the syndicate, i.e. if the CVC makes a better offer to the same experienced 
(and not specialized syndicate), the profit of the CVC may be bigger than the profit derived by the 
IVC. However, given that the benefit resulting from specialization does not depend on the benefit 
resulting from experience, the IVC will never choose the stand-alone option at the next step in the 
matching/bargaining stage of the game. If it chooses as second-best partner the specialized syndicate, 
its level of selection will be higher than the level of the CVC. If it chooses to match with the 
experienced syndicate, its level of selection will be lower than the level of selection of the CVC. It is 
the only case where the level of selectivity and/or the profit of the IVC is not higher than the level of 
selectivity and/or the profit of the CVC.     
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- if the IVC chooses initially to syndicate with experienced partners, when its choices are confirmed, 
the same deductions can be made. In this case, as it is not optimal for the IVC to syndicate with a 
specialized syndicate (experienced or not), specialized syndicates are no more interesting for the CVC. 
The specialized syndicate then has to choose between the CVC and the IVC according to the amount 
of profit on the rehabilitated bad projects shared with it by each. If the offer of the IVC is better, given 
that the advantage is bigger for the good than the bad projects for the IVC, the IVC may not always 
show the highest level of selection of bad projects but will have the biggest profit. If the offer is not 
the better, the IVC’s profit may be smaller than the profit gained by the CVC. However, given that the 
experienced (and not specialized) syndicate ultimately provides the smallest selection possible, the 
level of selection will be higher for IVC than for the CVC ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
